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The subject of leasing in the public sector and, in particular, the 
concept of the Navy leasing its auxiliary ships first came to my attention while 
reviewing the background studies for the CEB presentation on the AO-75. In 
these studies the analyst \Y'as able to establish leasing as a preferred alter-
native over purchase. This was accomplished by using the present discounted 
value of the various dollar "cost" streams and then ranking the alternatives 
on the basis of minimum discounted values. As it turned out, the present 
discounted value of the lease option ($214.3) '.-las less than the present dis-
counted value of the purchase option ($360.n and, thus, leasing was presented 
as a cost-effective method of obtaining AC's. 
This lease-purchase analysis for the AO-75 was quite general, and I was 
immediately struck by its implication. If the analyst was correct in the case 
of the AO-75, then there did not appear to be any reason for the Navy to 
actually own any of the new ships in the fleet. If it was cost-effective to 
lease an oiler, why wasn't it cost-effective to lease a carrier? '.Jas it stra-
tegic importance that dictated actual ownership of a carrier? This was 
doubtful, since in a conflict situation an oiler might be just as important as 
a carrier. Was it the Internal Revenue Service residual value requirement? 
Would the carrier fail to qualify for leasing eligibility under the tax law 
because of too low a residual or post-lease value? This was a possibility, 
but it ~Y'as not obvious that carriers and other combatants would necessarily 
fail the residual value test. In fact, based on the background analysis for 
the CEB presentation on the AO-75 , there did not appear to be any apparent 





With this implication of the AO-75 analysis firmly in mind, I began a 
detailed investigation of leasing as an alternative to government purchase. 
In the course of this investigation, I analyzed the mechanics of leasing, the 
Navy's prior experience with marine leasing (MSC tanker lease program) and 
the logic of leasing in both the private and public sectors. On this latter 
and quite important point, my conclusions are straightforward. If the Navy 
wishes to minimize the resources necessary to accomplish its defense mission, 
then it will choose to own the fleet. 
My conclusions on this point appear to be in direct conflict tvith most 
of the analysis on the AO-75 and certainly with the supporting documents on 
cost-effectiveness of the MSC leasi{r Build and Charter Program signed on 
June 20, 1972. The reason for this divergence is straightforward. Specifically, 
the studies underlying the MSC lease transaction of 6/72 and the proposed 
AO-75 lease all have two shortcomings: 1) the studies fail to adequately ac-
count for the economic nature of leasing in the public sector, and 2) the 
studies evidence a lack of understanding concerning the appropriate role of 
discounting in public sector decisions. Of course, the Navy is not alone in 
this department. Neither the OMB circulars on leasing nor the GAO study of 
MSC's Build and Charter Program reveal any deeper insights into the nature of 
leasing or the logic of discounting. Nevertheless, it was the Navy's analysis 
that attempted to show that there was a "free lunch" or equivalently, how through 
the "magic" of discounting leasing could reduce the cost of our auxiliary ship 
programs. Unfortunately, there is no "free l1.\nch" and leasing does not reduce 
the resource costs of our auxiliary ship programs. In fact, if anything, 
leasing actually increases the true cost of a defense program. 
The Navy's previous economic analysis on the lease-purchase decision 'vas 
seriously inadequate. It is my intention in this report to both review thos e 
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inadequacies and to present a reasonably clear overview of the mechanics and 
logic of leasing in the public sector. 
II. The Mechanics of Leasing 
As noted in CDR Walsh's memo (96 D/154) of October 25, 1973, Build and 
Charter or leasing "is essentially a civilian corporate financing scheme ••.. " 
The precise nature of leasing as a financing scheme is best summarized in a 
recent article that appeared in Fortune magazine (November 1973) on "The 
Powerful Logic of the Leasing Boom." In this article the author explores the 
Anaconda Company's lease of an aluminum-reduction mill and, in the process, 
explains the details of such. transactions in the private sector. While sub-
sequent investigation revealed several numerical errors in the article, the 
major concepts are correct, and I would strongly advise it being read by 
public sector analysts working on lease transactions. 
In summarizing the mechanics of the Anaconda transaction, the author 
states: "The point of this involved exercise, from Anaconda's point of view, 
is to reduce the cost of financing the plant." 'fuile this is a simple point, 
with the possible exception of Memo 96 D/154, the Navy's analysis of leasing 
pays inadequate attention to this point. Leasing in the private sector is 
simply a method of reducing the costs of financing an asset. 
The reduction in financing costs is accomplished by "selling" or more 
accurately trading the depreciation on an asset to an individual or group of 
individuals whose tax benefits from the depreciation are greater than those 
accruing to the asset user. Although, as the Fortune article emphasizes that 
the details of a large equipment lease are complex, the basic mechanics of 
trading the depreciation and, hence, the lease package itself are quite 
straightfoT"ard. Instead of arranging conventional financing either through the 




the asset, the asset user arranges to lease the asset from a special purpose 
leasing intermediary. Substantially, the lease payment is differentiated 
from the loan payment in name only. The lease payment is, in fact, an 
in terest and amortization payment on the capital value of the asset. The 
crucial difference from the lessee's point of view is that the effective 
interest rate on the lease is less than the effective interest rate on his 
next best commercial alternative. This "bargain" is obtained by letting the 
lessor take the tax advantage from the asset's depreciation. 
The actual effective interest rate on the lease is determined primarily 
by the structure of the special purpose leasing intermediary (Marine Transport 
Lines, Inc., in the MSC lease program) or equivalently, the debt-equity struc-
ture of the lease package. ~lhile the asset owners of record ~Yill obtain the 
entire depreciation on the asset, they will not, in general, directly finance 
the entire asset. Instead, these 'owners or equity participants will provide 
some fraction of the funds, a, and will rely on bondholders to finance the 
remaining portion, (l-a) , of the transaction. The equity participants will 
usually finance thei.r share at a zero interest rate and rely on the tax-savings 
from the depreciation to generate a satisfactory rate of return. The bond-
holders on the other hand will receive the rate of interest that the lessee 
-
would normally pay on first mortgage bonds. l Thus, the effective rate of 
interest, (er), on a lease package will in general be given by the expression 
er = (l-a)r, where r is the corporation's normal interest rate on its 
e 
1 Actually, unless the lessee pledges its credit to the bonds directly 
as well as to the lease itself, the bondholders will demand a small premium 




2 first mortgage bonds. Obviously, the larger a the lower the effective 
interest rate on the lease package. 
Part of the skill involved in designing or "put ting together" a lease 
package is finding an a high enough to satisfy the lessee and low enough to 
attract sufficient equity funding. The actual equity proportion, a, in 
~~ 
. oIl d d h 1 ° f the "qual;ty _Qv' any transact~on ~ epen on w at easing execut~ves re er to as • ~ 
of the lease." This quality dimension includes factors such as the allowable 
life of the asset for tax purposes, its eligibility for the investment credit, 
the relationship between tax life and lease length, and the specific termina-
tion provisions included in the lease arrangements. For example, all things 
equal, the equity proportion, a, will be larger the shorter the allowable 
life of the asset for tax purposes. Of course, only in a perfectly competitive 
market can we be sure that the technical aspects of the lease entirely deter-
mine a. In an imperfectly competitive market there is a possibility that 
factors other than the "quality of the lease" may enter the determination of 
the equity proportion. 
Since the lessee and the equity participants to a lease transaction are 
likely to be corporate entities and face the same nominal tax rates, only if 
the lessee must "waste" some of the depreciation on investment credit will 
the effective interest rate on a lease be less than the after tax cost of a 
conventionally financed purchase. In the limit, if the lessee can use all of 
the tax advantages of ownership (depreciation and investment credit), then 
there will not exist any a < 1 3 that will be acceptable to the lessee. On 
2In practice, an asset like a ship or mill takes time to produce and, 
consequently, interim financing arrangements will have an effect on the ef-
fective interest rate. Since during construction no zero interest rate funds 
will be involved, if the interim financing rate is greater than (l-a)r, the 
effective rdte will exceed (er). 
30f course even at a = I the lessee '''ill be indifferent only if there 
are no transaction costs. 
) 
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the other hand, if the lessee cannot use any of the tax benefits of ownership, 
then, transaction costs aside, any a > 0 would be acceptable to the lessee. 
Thus, in general, the minimum a acceptable to the lessee will be an increasing 
function of the lessee's projected tax benefits from ownership. 
Transaction costs aside, leasing at any a > 0 should result in the 
Navy IIpaying ll an explicit interest rate below the long-term government rate. 
Even if the transaction costs or lease fee and interim financing costs are 
considered, leasing at relatively low values of a should result in explicit, 
effective interest rates below the long-term government rate. Whether this 
has been the case and, more significantly, whether an effective lease rate 
below the long-term government rate is a necessary or sufficient condition for 
selling the fleet, are questions that are discussed in more detail below. 4 
While the Navy does not pay taxes and it would appear that its IInet 
) interest advantage ll from leasing could be obtained by merely taking the dif-
ference between (erl and the long-term government rate, GAO has suggested an 
) 
alternative approach. GAO considers that the Navy's sale of depreciation via 
leasing has a IIcost 11 to the Federal Sector in that taxes that would have been 
paid currently will be paid in the future. In other words, the Federal Sector 
will "suffer" a tax deferral. Analytically then, GAO, without the slightest 
indication that it realized it, was advocating that the Navy consider itself 
in the position somewhat similar to that of a firm that could utilize the tax 
benefits from ownership. After all, GAO's suggestion implies that the depre-
ciation has a value to the government in terms of present tax receipts, and if 
4Note that if one accepts the Navy's position on deferred taxes and 
follmvs the guidance in OMB-A76 as suggested by GAO in their "Report to Congress 
on the Build and Charter Program for Nine Tanker Ships, 11 er < long-term 
government rate becomes the criterion for deciding on the cost effectiveness 
of leasing. 
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) the budget is invarient to the lease decision then presumably the government 
will have to borrow against future taxes to cover the present tax shortfall. 
Thus the GAO suggestion raises the a at which the interest costs to the 
Federal Sector would be less under leasing than under purchase by direct 
b . 5 orrOWl.ng. Again ~vhether the Federal Sector approach suggested by GAO is 
an appropriate criterion for the leasing decision is discussed in more detail 
below. 
III. MSC Build and Charter Program 
On June 20) 1972 the Navy signed an agreement with several special-purpose 
corporations (Marine Ship Leasing Corp. and Harine Vessel Leasing Corp.) to 
lease nine I1handy size l1 tankers. Because the details of the lease package are 
adequately reviewed in the GAO's Report to the Congress on the Build and Charter 
Program I will restrict my comment.s to several interesting implications of the 
, 
lease transaction. 
In the case of the MSC lease package a or the equity proportion of the 
lease was approximately 26%. This compares with an a of approximately 35% 
in the Anaconda lease. Of course one might argue, based on the discussion above, 
that the equity differential is due to qualitative differences in the leases. 
In order to test this hypothesis we should control for quality differences by 
comparing the MSC package to a similiar private sector marine lease. Unfortunately, 
to date, I have been unable to obtain reliable historical data on comparable 
private sector marine leases. However, I have been able to establish that the 
current mode in marine leasing involves a value of 30% with some transactions 
having values as high as 35%. It would be extremely interesting to explore the 
reason for MSC's apparently lmv a value. Perhaps the structure of marine 
) leasing has changed since 1972 or perhaps there was a problem in the original 
5 The federal Sector cost analysis in both 96D/154 and the GAO report are 
an indirect method of explaining this point. 
) 
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MSC lease design. 
Turning our attention now to the debt portion of the lease, (I-a), we 
find an equally interesting anomaly in the MSC lease. The interest rate 
(r) on the build and charter lease bonds was 7 7/8%, and this was significantly 
6 
above the long term government rate. In fact the long. term government rate 
in June 1972 was 5.59% and thus the MSC lease involved paying an interest rate 
of approximately 2 1/4% higher than the lessee's (U.S. government) conventional 
interest rate. 
While this phenomenon was noted by CDR Walsh in the context of the pro-
posed AO-75 lease his explaination was inadequate. The interest rate on lease 
bonds is not simply determined by the long. term interest rate since there is 
no unique long-term interest rate. At best there is a long-term interest rate 
appropriate to each class of security. For example, there is a long-term rate 
) on AAA bonds and this rate is lower than the rate on BBB bonds. Traditionally, 
lm"est of all long-term rates is the rate on governments. 
) 
In constructing a lease the leasing firm atteBpts to set the interest rate 
on the bonds at the level that the firm 'l7Ould pay on its conventionally financed 
asset purchases. This is usually the long-teno first-mortgage rate appropriate 
to the rating of the firm involved. Having the firm assume responsibility for 
both the lease and the bonds will almost al,,,ays assume that t;"e rate on the bonds 
is the same as the lessee's conventional financing rate. For example, the in-
terest rate on the Anaconda lease bonds ,,,ere within 1/4% of the interest rate 
offered for conventional financing of the mill and this 1/4% can be explained 
by technical factors. 
6CDR Walsh makes a similiar observation concerning the bond rate in the pro-
posed AO-75 package and obiously his points #1, on pg. 3 is relevant only for r 
and not er. 
7Anaconda decided to lease some time after the 8 7/8% quote and thus in the 
o pinion of one authority the 1/4% premium had more to do ,,,ith timing and changes 




Why then did MSC pay an interest rate far above the long-term government 
rate? While there are some technical items such as the inability of the Navy 
to directly guarantee the lease bonds and differences in the market for govern-
ments and government-backed lease bonds these do not appear to account for the 
magnitude of the differential. To date, I have not been fully satisfied by any 
of the explanations offered for this rate differential. Only further empirical 
work can solve this mystery. 
The combined effect of the MSC lease provisions was to yield an effective 
interest rate of 5.961% on the transaction. Note that the effective rate on 
the Anaconda lease signed at approximately the same time was 5.542%. In the 
Anaconda case the interest rate on conventional financing was 8 7/8 - 9 1/8 
and, thus, Anaconda "saved" over 3% by using a leasing option. For MSC the 
lease rate was at best equal to the government's lending rate and, thus, by 
using a complex leasing package MSC' managed to save nothing on the interest 
rate. If anything, the MSC lease actually obliged the u.s. government to pay a 
slightly higher interest rate for the privilege of leasing. It is interesting 
to note that a private firm in l~C's pOSition would not have found the lease 
option very attractive. 
IV. Is Leasing by the Public Sector Cost-Effective? 
In the introduction I noted that leasing of the type entered into by MSC 
in the tanker transaction is not desirable from a social point of view. How-
ever, most of the Navy analysis on this topic argues for the cost-effectiveness 
of leasing. For example, in the presentation given to the CEB on the AO-75 
the analyst sho~ved that the present discounted "cost" of leasing was less than 
the discounted "cost" of a straight purchase. Likewise, the analysis supporting 





be minimized by leasing. How then can I maintain that leasing is a non-optimal 
policy when careful studies in the area have shown that leasing is less expensive 
than purchase? 
To begin, let us turn our attention to the "numbers game" involved in the 
original studies of the MSC tankers and AO-75's. As CDR Walsh correctly ob-
served in his memo of October 25, 1973: "Any charter arrangement where the 
effective interest rate is less than the discount rate will make the Build and 
8 Charter appear more favorable." Since through mos t of the analysis, including 
the CEB presentation on the AO-75 , the analyst was following OMB circular A-94 
and using a discount rate of 10% while the effective lease rates were substan-
tially below that, leasing always looked favorable. Clearly any time the discount 
rate exceeds the effective lease finance rate, borrowing will appear to have a 
negative cost and leasing will be preferred to simple purchase. 
If the analysis supporting the MSC transaction was correct, then it would 
be cost-effective to vest the actual o~mership of the fleet in the private 
sector. The implications of the MSC tanker and early AO-75 analysis should have 
indicated that something was wrong with the approach. Apparently only after the 
GAO questioned the discount rate did the Navy have some second thoughts. 
CDR Halsh' s analysis draws out some of the implications of the early studies 
but stops short of finding the logical errors in previous Navy, GAO and OMB 
approaches to the leasing question. 
As far as I can tell from the information available to me, all parties 
to the leasing controversy agree on the basic approach used in the Navy's analysis 
of the lease-purchase decision. GAO's disagreement with the Navy centers on the 
appropriate rate of discount (A-76 vs. A-94) and the nature of tax "costs" due 
8Note while GAO was critical of the discount rate used by the Navy they 
never clearly stated this very simple point. 
II 
to leasing. It does not appear that GAO disagreed with the basic framework 
used by the Navy in their analysis. 
My disagreement with the Navy analysts is more basic than the objections 
raised by GAO. Build and Charter or lease arrangements of the type entered 
into by MSC for its tankers is, as \ve have discussed above, basically a private 
sector financing device. It is a technique used by private firms to reduce 
the interest costs on borrmved funds. Even if it \l7as theoretically possible 
to do the same for the public sector as a whole, it is not clear that such re-
duced interest payments have any meaning for th.e public sector. 9 After all . 
government interest payments are predominately transfers between individuals 
in the private sector. Minimizing government interest payments by leasing is 
unlikely to save any significant amount of resources. 
The failure to focus on the real resource costs in the lease-purchase 
decision is my basic objection to'previous analysis in the. area. Building 
ships require the same resources whether the ships are financed by taxes, 
direct government debt or by indirect debt in the form of a lease. The diver-
sion of real resources from the private to th.e public sector for building the 
ships is the same in all cases. Leasing of the MSC type does not reduce the 
amount of private output that must be sacrificed in order to construct a Navy 
ship. 
In fact, if one looks at the total costs of procurement, leasing tends 
to increase the costs of obtaining Navy ships. The incremental costs of trans-
ferring resources through the established mechanisms of taxation and direct debt 
are fairly low 'l7hile the resource costs of transferring resources via leasing 
91Vhile the Navy can certainly reduce its explicit effective interest pay-
ments below the long term government rate it is not clear that this ,,,ill reduce 
total interest payments made by the public sector. 
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appear to be quite high. Note that on the MSC transaction the lease fee was 
approximately 2% or $3 million and is likely, given the structure of the 
leasing industry, that most of this represented real resource costs. Thus 
transferring resources from the private to the public sector by leasing ac-
tually consumes a significant volume of resources, For this reason alone long-
term leasing of the MSC tanker type shou10 usually be rejected as an inefficient 
method of achieving the Navy's defense mission. 
Why, if leasing actual~y consumes more resources than purchase, does its 
discounted dollar "cost" almost always turn out less than a straight purchase? 
As explained above and in 96-D/154, the mechanical reason is simply that the 
discount rate is higher than the effective lease finance rate. Does this imply, 
as CDR Walsh and GAO suggest, that the discount rate was too high? Not neces-
'1 10 san. y. The discount rate is an attempt to give the analyst a "magic number" 
) representing the opportunity cost· over time of real resources in the private 
) 
sector. In most government projects the relevant financial or budget flm-.Ts occur 
at nearly the same tiMe as the resource flm-.Ts and thus no ambiguity arises when 
the analyst uses the discount rate on financial or budget flows. Hm-.Tever, when 
the resource and budget flm-.Ts occur at significantly different points in time, 
as in the case of the Navy Lease programs, the use of the social discount rate 
on actual dollar f1mv-s gives misleading results. The fact that the discounted 
dollar value of th= lease payments is less than the discounted dollar purchase 
costs is basically meaningless, 
In general, leasing of the MSC or Anaconda type should not be undertaken 
11 by the public sector for any asset. For most cases involving a lease-purchase 
10~~ile the discount rate appropriate for defense project costs may not be 
the 10% rate this argument is independent of the leasing problem, 
lIThe only substantial exception Houid be those cases in which the analyst 
can shmv- that leasing in some. way reduces the real resource costs of the proj ect. 
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decision, the correct answer (the Navy retains ownership of the fleet) may be 
obtained within the formal discounting frame~vorr( by setting up the problem in 
the following manner: 
1) Asset construction under a lease option involves the same real 
resource flow as purchase. Therefore, disregard the -dollar lease payments 
and substitute for the asset's cost in the lease option the flow of dollar 
payments associated with a straight purchase. 
2) In addition to the asset costs in $1 determine the flow of resources 
used in arranging the lease and add these to the flows under #1. 
3) NOtv calculate the present discounted values of both the modified 
lease program and the straight purchase. 
Obviously the discounted costs of straight purchase will always be less 
than the discounted costs of leasing under this scheme. Hence if the Navy uses 
) the discount rate in a consistent' manner it ~vill be optimal for it to mvn the 
fleet. 
V. A Note on Sources 
In addition to the published material available on the Navy and selected 
private lease transactions, I have relied in my investigation on numerous tele-
phone conversations with responsible personnel at CitiCorp Leasing, U. S. Leasing, 
Salomon Brothers, Fortune, OMB and GAO. 
''':DC·! fO BL1T.LD A~{ll CtL4D.TER Ai~ALYSI S 
~.- ---.----- - -_ .. _-------
In footnote ~2 of my previous me~o (!4 March) I ;av~ the f01loving 
r is the riite of interest on the lease bo;.ns. Tl.is '''?os for toe 
::.:'a1 case, as in the B & C example. "There the r·~t2 of return on the 
:ity share. ry, was zero. However, comparing th~ MSC Build 3nd Charter 
--~ to the Anaconda lease is facilitated by using the mere general 
.::::::ionsnip, 
1) er - LR - u·rr + (I-a) . r 
LR is the lease rate and rr is the rate of interest paid by the 
_ c..2 011 the equity share of t he lease. 
'!:'he Lease Ra~e on t:'1e Build and Charter Le~~_~_J.ac~ 
·_p.e GAO report (B174839) and the ~avy' s own prelir:;ina.ry data s:,ows 
:::he projected undiscounted payments on the ~:::;c trans<:lction amounted to 
• SO million of \'lhich $270 million ","'as represen:ed as princip21 and 
:~eive back fran the N3VY approxio2tely $43 milliGo ~hich represents 
: in1ti21 contributions (540 million as 2. sh<11'[: of tht: lease per se 
... ~ nillion as a fee to }~arinE' Transpc·rt L i.nes. Hence in the }lSC 
::he rEte of return paid rp tlte eqt: ity holder~: b,' lh~ Navv t..:", ,,: ';H0-
.;. d to be. ze ro. 




~m2ly clns~ ro the rate used in my original p~per and the one 
~cd by CitiCutp Leasing he. (.05961) CitiCQrp's letter is :lttached 
<:.a exhibit. 
However one cae also obtain the lease rate by using the ciiscou~ted 
.::::e:nt v?.1ue appr03ch. Specifically for what lease ratets) (LR) does 
following equation hold'? 
2) LA 
n 
L (1 + LR)-iR Lease Amo~ll1t 
i=l 
.:.. .. :e R is the rental, lease or charter payment. Since the payments 
non-unitorn in the HSC cast! (2) becomes, 
2') LA 
n z 
-i -j ~ (1 + LR) Rl + ~ (1 + LR) R2 
i=l j=n+l 
is the charter fee for the first n years and is the 
~ter fee for years n..l...1 , ... to the lease termination in year z. 
'.:::; the data contained in the GAO r2Dort \·:e can subst itute in (2') 
r~7rite the expression as 
2") $160,000,000 
10 ~ (1 + LR)-i $9,450,000 + 
i=l 
20 
(l + LR)-j $21,628,000 
i =lJ 
~~is case a lease rate of 5.91% (.0591 LR) will result in virtual 
. .:lit'{ bE"t\oJeen the tHe sides of (2,,).1 
1 
-Actually at LR = .0591, the' rigbt hand Sloe of 2" is equ21 t(' $159,878,000. 
~ifference between this and $lGO,OOO,OOO is due, T assume, to roundin~ and 
:,i.:;le tllllio;g €!'rors. It c;h"'.lld be nl~tpc tl:at. buth thi .... J?r'~C2.':' Clnd the 011e 
'~'.lation (1') consider only the chnr::er pa~l11ents and not the. ini~ ial pa:~enr. 
. ·~,156,OOO on the lease fee.. Consi:lering this initi:;l1. Pd:.-n~er:t aad lease fee 
:::'6 transform to 
10 20 
~~2,156,Ot)CJ + L: (l+LR)"i. 89,':'lO.OUO + (hUn ~2j ,c:28,OOC 
i=l j=ll 
. ::'ce!:' T (' .1:'::: a in ;; I!1(jr~ j)1"c-cisE:- figure fpr 2 t 3nd a m('re ;h' Cl:T'2 t'e f ()rmlll;~ c. j 0r, 
. ~ I & 211) i vl0tllc rC.~l ... L. 0.: ... .:.:.:.~y at Llt,,'" .' •.• '.~':" ( -t(-.;;Sc· \i\'1\. ·~ ;-:.;:, -,' --C1.,.:"t .• :1'". ,'. 
the d;)t c 1: jo :lav e available the S.961~~ i·a tt: quoted by Citi.~·~'l'[·' :!I·'P:.:-;J;.": 
_ t:::::trc:'.:l v cl.~s e to '11)' estimJte and one 1:L:J~ \·:.1S C,1~~Uti:'':' ii'! .:: ::nr:nt:r 
:-ly t· ~': . : .:. . rac.l. -=- to t h e ~(!ttlt-,(~ uSee. c": tT, S _ 1.1::'c!~i~g ('"In tht" ·'.:1:3.'-":"r.da 
.:-:. t 1 Ct 
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The .A.J1ac('n.~2. lease like. tl1f' ~1SC leds·- has a 20 J ear tt2I1!1 end is 
- ~:lctured Idth :t ~. wo-tiel- payment syste:r.. The paymer.ts ir; the Earl:,-
_ ~rs of Lhe lease are signifj ~ antly lower than those in the latter years. 
:::conda's lease invoh'e.d semi-annual ?a~1ffients, thl:' first of ~·]hich \.,Tas 
.:: on the day the lease became effective. Thus the present value approach 
f) calc~lat ing their lease rate is obtainerl by finding a serni.annual lease 




$3,984,352.58 (1 + SLR)-i + 
39 $5,463,692.~7 (l+SLR)-j. 
j=20 
this case the SLR which satisfies ,>"' is .027336 or in terms of an 
.~al lease rate it is .05542. 2 Thus U.S. Leasing's quote of 5.542% as 
lease rate on the Anaconda transaction does satisfy C;: '''). 
Now to calcualre the lease rate using the alternative method suggested 
) (1) we have to note the special propert y of the equitv p3yback in the 
) 
,::':;r:da lease. In tbis lease the equity participants or O1n'ners put up 
; 769,230 (35% of the lease) but will receive ba ck from Anaconda in terms 
~:~eir sh<J.re of the. rental [,ayments, only S32,091,S06.69. Thus the equity 
.:icipants ac tU.:illy "loan" funds to Anaconda at a ne[;3t i\"e. interest rate. 
s~!!liam: u21 terms it is a rare (srr) tnat will saLisfy the follm.:iLlg expreSS~L~:l; 
3) $33,769,230 = $3,984,352.58 + 
- = - . 005584 or on annual rate Irr) cf -.0111: wi1 1 
'") 
t ... i..i • 
See ..:-
3 ( 'J . 
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) 
'.:he NSC transiictL:'i. The t'·.'0 differ in forr:: cniy Lp~·2.use t~.er<:.· ;s a 
-·trivial, r1<"·.;a::iv<:; i:nplied intet.::st ra.te c'n the equity c'ontrjbuticn in 
_ Anaconda Lease'. 
. -~ 
AccorJing to the information I heve evailable at this time the quotation 
'.:he lease rate by CitiCorp on the MSC transection and the quotation by 
Leasing on the Anaconda transaction appear to be calculated in the same 
.• (:r. Hore precision in checkin2 the CiriCorp ~~c~:ciC'n could be obtained 
~2ferring directly to the lease documents. 
) 
) 
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